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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
CAN A STATE MORE EFFECTIVELY
REGULATE CORPORATIONS UNDER THE
RESERVE CLAUSE OF ITS CONSTITUTION
THAN UNDER ITS POLICE POWER?
By MAx SCHOETZ, JR., B.A., LL.B.
Dean of Marquette Law School
When the Railroad Regulation Act and Public Utilities Acts
were passed by our legislature, they were deemed to have been
passed under the police power of the state; but as the acts have
undergone keen attacks in the courts by eminent counsel for the
railroads and utilities, it would seem a new idea has arisen for
their effective administration with reference to the power under
which the acts were passed. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
seems finally, although with some hesitation, to have bottomed
the act on the reserve power of the Constitution.'
THE RESERVE POwER
The reserve power of the Constitution is found in Section I,
Article XI, and is as follows:
Corporations without banking powers or privileges may be formed
under general laws but shall not be created by special act, except for
municipal purposes, and in cases where in the judgment of the legislature,
the objects of the corporation cannot be obtained under general laws. The
general laws or special acts enacted under the provisions of this section
may be altered or repealed by the legislature at any time after their
passage.
The legislature has enacted in statutory form also a reserve
clause in the following language:
SECTION 1768. The legislature may at any time limit or restrict the
powers of any corporation organized under any law and, for just cause
annul the same and prescribe such mode as may be necessary for the
settlement of its affairs.
Six years after the adoption of our State Constitution the case
of Madison, W. & M. P. Co. vs. Reynolds, 3 Wis., 287, and the
'Manitowoc vs. Manitowoc N. T. Co., 145 Wis., 13.,
LaCrosse vs. LaCrosse G. & E. Co., 145. Wis., 408.
Kenosha vs. Kenosha Home Telephone Co., 149 Wis., 338.
Milwaukee Electric R. R. & L. Co. vs. R. R. Com., 153 Wis., i92.
Superior W. L. & P. Co. vs. Superior, I74 Wis., 257.
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case of Pratt vs. Brown, 3 Wis., 6o3, came before the Supreme
Court and the scope and effect of Section i, Article XI, were
discussed and it was in effect declared that all rights and fran-
chises of a corporation are received, held, and exercised solely
upon the faith of the sovereign grantor and during its pleasure.
In the case of Attorney-General vs. Railroad Companies, 35 Wis.,
425, the court says: (Page 573)
The object and historical origin of the provision in the Constitution of
this state are matters known to all professional men. They were, through
this paramount authority, to retain and secure to the state full power and
control over corporate franchises, rights and privileges which it might
grant-a power and control which the state was in a measure deprived of
by the federal constitution, as that instrument had been interpreted in the
celebrated Dartmouth College case. With the grant of exemption from
taxation was annexed the reservation that such grant might be altered or
revoked by the legislature at any time after its passage. It was a qualifica-
tion of the grant and the subsequent exercise of the reserved power
cannot be regarded as an act impairing the obligation of contracts. And
the court sustained the exercise of the reserved right.
This has been the unanimous opinion and decision of this court, always,
in all cases before it. And, by force of the constitutional power reserved
and of the uniform construction and application of it, the rule in Dart-
mouth College Case, as applied to corporations, never had place in this
state, never was the law here. The state emancipated itself from the
thraldom of that decision, in the act of becoming a state; "and corporations
since created here have never been above the law of the land.
Subject to this reserved right, and under te rule in the Dartmouth
College Case, charters of private corporations are contracts, but contracts
which the state may alter or determine at pleasure. Contracts of that
character are not unknown in ordinary private dealings; and such we
hold to be the sound and safe rule of public policy. It is so in England. It
is so under the federal government itself. The material property and rights
of corporations should be inviolate, as they are here; but it comports with
the dignity and safety of the state that the franchises of corporations
should be subject to the power which grants them, that corporations should
exist,as the subordinates of the state, which is their creator, durante bene
placitb.
Justice Timlin in his concurring opinion in Milwaukee Electric
Railway & Light Company vs. Railroad Commission, 153 Wis.,
192, gave this question considerable study and in his opinion, at
page 623, reviews not only the Wisconsin Constitutional provi-
sions with reference to the reserve clause but also those of other
states.
Justice Barnes in Manitowoc vs. Manitowoc N. T. Company,
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145 Wis., 13, had the reserve clause under consideration and on
page 28 says:
Furthermore, the right conferred on the Railroad Company to use the
public streets, under Section 1862 or Section 1863, becomes one of the
corporate franchises of the corporation to which it is granted, the City
acting as a delegated agent of the State in granting it. (Citing cases.)
This being so, the reserve power of amendment or repeal, contained in
Section i, Article XI, Constitution, would seem to empower the legislature
to modify the conditions on which such franchise was given, as well as
to repeal or amend the franchise itself.
Justice Owen in Superior W. L. & P. Co. vs. Superior, 174
Wis., 257, page 284, says:
We believe that when it was included in the Constitution it was placed
there for the purpose of reserving to the people of this State full power
and control over corporations of its creation; that the purpose to be ac-
complished thereby was to reserve to the State those sovereign rights of
which the states had been shorn by the decision in the Dartmouth College
case, and that any construction which limits the scope of this power to a
narrower field amounts to a judicial deprivation of sovereign rights which
the people believe they had preserved to themselves by the terms of Section
i, Article XI, of the Constitution.
This construction implies no denial of vested or property rights in
valuable privileges granted to a corporation, essentially connected with its
franchise and necessary to its business, which conduced to an acceptance
of its charter and am: organization under it. Such privileges are property.
But in this state they are not unencumbered property. They are en-
cumbered with the right of the state to alter or repeal them. The title
of the grantee is necessarily qualified because that is the only title the
state can give. The constitutional provision under consideration deprived
the legislature of the power of granting an unqualified right. The grantee
takes them subject to this power of the state to alter or repeal. The
corporation which invests its money in reliance upon such privileges does
so id the faith that thq power will not be unjustly or unreasonably exer-
cised. And here it may be said that the power is not one to be used for the
purposes of spoilation or oppression. It is a power which the state is
permitted to invoke only for the promotion and the protection of public
interests. That is the purpose for which it was reserved. It is not to be
used arbitrarily or capriciously or for the purpose of punishment or
retaliation. That has been decided by this court (citing cases). It is an
instrument of justice, not a weapon of discipline.
Thus the courts in Wisconsin have sought to make effective
the reserve power in our Constitution and especially with refer-
ence to the regulation of railroads and public utilities. But instead
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of the broad powers announced by Justice Timlin that "all rights
and franchises of a corporation are received, held, and exercised
solely upon the faith of the sovereign grantor and during its
pleasure," it has been somewhat limited by the narrow construc-
tion given to the reserve power by Justice Owen limiting it only
"for the promotion and the protection of public interests" and
not at the pleasure of the legislature as heretofore announced.
THaE POLICE POWER
When one becomes a member of a society he necessarily parts
with some right or privileges which as an individual he might
retain. A body politic is a social contract by which the whole
people covenant with each other, and each citizen with the whole
people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common
good. This does not confer on the whole people power to control
rights exclusively private. It does authorize the establishment
of laws requiring each citizen to so conduct, and so use, his own
property as not to unnecessarily injure another. This is the very
essence of government and has its foundation in the maxim,
"So use your own as not to injure another's property." From
this source came the police powers, which are nothing more or
less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty;
that is, the power to govern men and things-the power to make
laws under these powers. The government regulates the conduct
of its citizens, one toward another, and the manner in which each
shall use his own property, when such regulation becomes neces-
sary for the public good. Justice Marshall in the case of State
vs. Redinon, 134 Wis., 89, 105, defined police power as follows:
What is this police power about which so much is said and which is so
commonly and generally speaking, legitimately invoked as a justification
for legislation regulating the affairs of life? .... .. Many attempts have
been made to define police power. There is good reason to say that the
multitude of such attempts with the many variations in phrasing the
matter have not added very much to the simple expression, that it is the
power to make all laws which, in contemplation of the .Constitution,
promotes the general welfare. That both defines the power and states the
limitations upon its exercise, it being understood that it is a judicial
function to determine the proper subject to be dealt with, and that it is a
legislative function, primarily, to determine the manner of dealing there-
with, but ultimately a judicial one to determine whether such manner of
dealing so passes the boundaries of reason as to overstep some constitu-
tional limitation, expressed or implied.... It is a great power, having
72
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more to do 'with the well being of society than any other, yet one which,
if exercised autocratically, would supercede some of the most cherished
principles of constitutional freedom.
In other words, the police power of a state embraces regulations
to promote the public convenience, or the general prosperity, as
well as regulations designed to promote the general health, public
morals, or public safety. It is not confined to the suppression of
what is offensive, disorderly or unsanitary, but extends to so
dealing with the conditions which exist in the state as to bring
out of them the greatest welfare of its people.
When private property is affected with a public interest it
ceases under the common law to be juris privati only. This has
been the doctrine of the common law for several hundred years.
Property becomes clothed with a public interest when used in a
manner to make it of public consequence and to affect the com-
munity at large. When one devotes his property to a use in
which the public has an interest he grants to the public an interest
in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for
the common good.
The following callings have been classed as being in a special
sense public occupations: (Anciently-in common law) The busi-
ness of carriers, ferrymen, wharfingers and millers, largely be-
cause such kinds of businesses were monopolistic in their nature.
The following more modern occupations and callings have been
considered and treated as public occupations: Railroads, telegraph
coimpanies, telephone companies, turnpike companies, canal com-
panies, warehouse companies (formed for general accommoda-
tion of the public), stockyard companies, water, light, heat and
power companies, river improvement companies, banking and
insurance companies, and companies formed for the gathering
and distribution of news of public quotations.
It will readily be seen that the public must patronize companies
of the kinds and classes stated, and that there can be no such thing
as general and effective competition in such lines of business.
These principles were brought out forcibly before the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Munn vs. Illinois, 94
U. S. 113, decided in 1876, where the validity of an act of the
legislature of Illinois fixing the maximum grain warehouse
charges was involved.
It was under this doctrine of the police power that the railroad
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rate regulation act and the public utility acts were passed to secure
to the public adequate service at reasonable rates, and it should
be noted that these acts were directed only against corporations
which were engaged in a public calling and devoting their property
to a public use, and it was not until the later decisions of our
court that these laws were deemed to have been passed under the
reserve power in our constitution.
RESERVE POWER COMPARED WITH POLICE POWER
It will be seen that under the police power it is only when a
corporation is affected with a public interest, and when its prop-
erty is used in a manner to make it of public consequence and to
affect the community at large, that it comes within the police
power of the state, while the reserve power may be exercised
against any corporation whether public or private. How far the
limitation placed upon it by Justice Owen, in Superior W. L. &
P. Co. vs. Superior, 174 Wis., 257, will prevent its exercise as
against private corporations, when he says, "It is a power which
the State is permitted to invoke only for the promotion and the
protection of public interests," remains for the future to solve.
justice Timlin said, "All rights and franchises of a corporation
are received, held and exercised solely upon the faith of the sov-
ereign grantor and during its pleasure." Chief Justice Ryan
said, "They were through this paramount authority to retain and
secure to the State full power and control over corporate f ran-
chises, rights and privileges, which it might grant . . . . 'and
corporations since created here have never been above the law of
the land." The writer of this article, and the then City Attorney,
in their brief, filed with the Supreme Court in the Milwaukee
Electric Railway & Light Co. vs. Railroad Commission of Wis-
consin, 153 Wis., 592, 6o2, took the position that the legislature
has power to regulate appellant's rate of fare as a valid exercise
of the power reserved to it under Section i, Article Io, of the
Constitution. Justice Timlin was the only judge who at all
agreed with this view, as is evidenced by his concurring opinion
in the case.
If the State can at its pleasure alter, repeal or amend a cor-
porate charter, this right cannot be limited only to public service
corporations.
Were we to classify the four essentials of corporate existence
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they would be placed in accordance with their importance in the
following order:
I. Immortality, or the right of perpetual. succession.
2. The right to contract, which includes the right to enter into
contracts, to charge for services and collect tolls.
3. The right to hold property.
4. The right to sue or be sued.2
What is there to prevent the State Legislature from enacting a
law limiting the number of years a private corporation as well as
a public corporation may remain in existence, or limiting its right
to contract only reasonably, thus limiting its right to contract
generally, or limiting the amount of property which a corporation
might hold, and do this under its reserve power, to alter, amend
or repeal any corporate power heretofore granted? It would
seem that the State's control over corporations is far greater
under its reserve power than under its police power.
'Brief submitted on behalf of City of Milwaukee by Daniel W. Hoan,
City Attorney, and Max Schoetz, Jr., of Counsel, in Milwaukee Ry. & L.
Co. vs. Railroad Commission, January term, 1913, case No. x6.
